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The Nationality of Ships and International
Responsibility: The Reflagging of The
Kuwaiti Oil Tankers
I. INTRODUCTION
"Nationality" is a term which has been used to define the legal rela-
tionship between a state and a ship authorized to fly its flag. The concept
is a corollary of the principle of freedom of the high seas.' It reflects the
belief that every ship should be subject to the sovereignty of some state
which can ensure that the ship fulfills its international responsibilities.2 A
ship looks first to the law of the state whose nationality it possesses for a
definition of its rights and duties. From the legislature of that state may
come both the promise of favorable regulation and the demand for new
standards in mechanical equipment or lifesaving devices.'
Maritime flags are a symbol of nationality. As such, they generally
are thought to be important for determining when a relationship exists
between a state and a ship and, thus, when a vessel is subject to the law
of a state." It is the thesis of this discussion, however, that maritime flags
fulfill a second purpose: Maritime flags not only represent a link between
a vessel and a state, but also represent a link between a state and the
international community. This linkage arises from the mutual responsi-
bilities which are corollary to the right to flag a ship.
States are subject to two categories of responsibility. First, responsi-
bilities arise in the decision of whether to flag a ship. States must grant
nationality to a ship under internationally respected criteria. Because in-
ternational law places few restrictions on the right to grant nationality to
ships, this responsibility is easily fulfilled. Second, responsibilities arise in
the sailing of a flagged vessel. The flag state has a general obligation to
neither impede nor endanger other states' use of international waters.
Consideration for the right of all states to sail on the high seas requires
that each state undertake efforts to sail safe ships.
The purpose of this discussion is to refocus analysis of the nationality
1. The S.S Lotus, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 at 25 (1927).
2. Several writers have stated that the entire legal system evolved for use of the high
seas depends upon each ship possessing the flag of a recognized international personality.
See, e.g. R. RIENOW, THE TEST OF THE NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL 12-15 (1937); M.
McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1066 (1962); N. Singh, Interna-
tional Law Problems of Merchant Shipping, 107 RECUEIL DE COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE
DRorr INT'L 19 (1962).
3. RIENOW, supra note 2, at 7.
4. See, e.g. I.M. Sinan, UNCTAD and Flags of Convenience, 96 J. WORLD TRADE 95,
at 95, 97 (1982).
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of ships in order to highlight the important state responsibilities which
are incumbent upon all flag-bearing states. A reexamination of the na-
tionality of ships is warranted in light of the United States' decision to
reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, a decision which may lead
to other political reflaggings. This discussion will examine the obligations
of flag states and determine whether the United States met these obliga-
tions in reflagging the tankers. It will examine: (1) whether the United
States gave its nationality to the Kuwaiti oil tankers under internation-
ally-accepted criteria and, thus, the tankers had the right under interna-
tional law to carry the American flag; and (2) whether the United States,
in sailing the Kuwaiti tankers, has fulfilled its responsibility to sail safe
ships. In order to provide a background for discussion of these issues, the
initial discussion will review the circumstances surrounding the reflagging
of the Kuwaiti tankers.
I. BACKGROUND: THE REFLAGGING OF KUWAITI OIL TANKERS
In response to the increasing frequency of attack on civilian vessels
arising out of the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait formulated a proposal in early
April, 1987, under which the U.S. would attempt to protect Kuwait-
owned ships from attack in the Persian Gulf by transferring the registra-
tion of tankers to the American flag.5 The Reagan Administration agreed
to the plan. The stated rationale was to preserve freedom of navigation in
the Persian Gulf.' In their letter to the United States Coast Guard, set-
ting forth the reflagging proposal, Kuwaiti officials offered another ration-
ale. They simply stated that "[tihe reasons for Kuwait wishing to reflag
are political. .. "
Representatives of the Coast Guard and representatives of the Ku-
wait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC) met on April 22 and 23, 1987, to ex-
plore the requirements for reflagging.8 The parties noted that the tankers
might fall below internationally acceptable standards in many areas, in-
cluding: life-saving equipment, automation, steering gear requirements,
fire protection, navigation, electrical installation, and ventilation sys-
tems.9 Facing political pressure, the Coast Guard agreed to waive certain
5. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1987, at A10, col. 3.
6. It has been suggested that there were deeper reasons for the reflagging: "to tilt to
Iraq by helping its ally, Kuwait... to block Soviet help for Arab moderates ... and to help
the Arab world forget the Iran arms-for-hostages fiasco." N.Y. Times, July 19, 1987, at E24,
col. 1. See also CONG. REc. H4095, 4104 (daily ed. June 2, 1987) [statement of Rep. Miller of
Washington]. President Reagan has admitted that protection of freedom of navigation is not
an altruistic goal. Rather, it is most important for Western economies because it will allow
Persian Gulf oil to reach Western markets. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1987 at Al, col. 2.
7. Letter to Captain James C. Card, Chief Merchant Vessel Inspection and Documen-
tation Division, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, from Tim Stafford, Manager Fleet Devel-
opment, Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (April 24, 1987).
8. Id.
9. Memorandum to members, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S.
House of Representatives, from Walter B. Jones, Chairman, and Robert W. Davis, Ranking
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procedures and regulatory requirements for a period of one year from cer-
tification.' 0 Nevertheless, the Coast Guard refused to grant waivers for
life preservers and any "manifestly unsafe conditions found during
inspections.""
After the April meetings, the reflagging process proceeded rapidly.
Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV requested national de-
fense waivers'" from the U.S. Coast Guard Navigation and Inspection
Laws and Regulations, the requirements of which exceed those contained
in the several applicable international conventions.' s Under the Code of
Federal Regulations, such waivers may be granted if they are "necessary
in the interest of national defense."' 4 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
noted the interests involved:
President Reagan has stated that the U.S. considers the continued
flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and freedom of navigation in
the Persian Gulf as interests of vital importance. The reflagging is
necessary to facilitate U.S. Naval protection of the Kuwaiti tankers in
and around the Persian Gulf."8
The Coast Guard granted the waiver request on May 29, 1987.'6 At the
same time, the Federal Communications Commission issued a one-year
exemption from the requirement that the Kuwaiti ships carry the type of
radio and telegraph equipment required of U.S. vessels.17
Kuwait circumvented the requirement that applications for docu-
mentation be made by U.S. citizens by forming Chesapeake Shipping,
Minority Member (June 5, 1987), [hereinafter House Memorandum].
10. Telex to Mr. Stafford, Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, from U.S. Coast Guard Head-
quarters (May 4, 1987).
11. Id.
12. The authority for the waiver is contained in the Act of December 27, 1950, 46 App.
U.S.C. note prec. 1 (1958). The waiver law originally was designed by the Truman Adminis-
tration to facilitate the movement of military supplies and personnel to the Korean conflict.
Many of the 132 waivers granted since 1950, however, were for coastwise movements and
were totally unrelated to military conflict. House Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6.
13. Memorandum for the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, William H. Taft IV, Dep-
uty Secretary of Defense (May 14, 1987).
14. 46 C.F.R. §6.01 (1986) [procedures for effecting individual waivers of navigation
and vessel inspection laws and regulations].
15. Memorandum from William H. Taft, supra note 13. Whether this actually consti-
tutes a national defense interest is open to debate. For the opinion that the reflagging re-
sponds more to politics and perceptions than to an objective military situation see N. Y.
Times, July 12, 1987 at E3, col.1.
16. Letter to William H. Taft, IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense, from P.A. Yost, U.S.
Coast Guard Commandant,(May 29, 1987). The Coast Guard has no discretion when the
Department of Defense requests a waiver. House Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6.
17. Telex to Tim Stafford, Chesapeake Shipping Inc., from Robert H. McNamara,
Chief, Aviation and Marine Branch, Federal Communications Commission (May 28, 1987).
See also Exemption Certificate, issued under the International Convention for Safety of
Life at Sea by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, for the M.T. Townsend (May
25, 1987).
1988
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Inc., a "paper company" incorporated in the U.S."8 Under a complex com-
mercial transaction, ownership of the tankers was shifted to Chesapeake
Shipping, which remained indirectly owned by the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker
Company.1" Applications for inspection were then submitted through
Chesapeake Shipping. The Coast Guard began its inspections in May,
1987, but due to the limited availability of each vessel, concentrated only
on major safety areas and granted one-year grace periods during which
strict compliance with U.S. laws would not be required.20 The vessels
were inspected individually and were re-registered at a slow pace
throughout the summer and early fall. 21
After the inspections had already begun, the Kuwait Oil Tanker
Company and The U.S. Coast Guard signed a formal memorandum of
agreement.22 The parties agreed to the one-year safety requirement waiv-
ers and to minimal manning requirements-only the master of each ves-
sel was required to be a U.S. citizen.2 Traditional U.S. manning require-
ments were avoided due to a loophole in the regulations, 24 which normally
require that upon leaving a U.S. port, all officers and 75% of the unli-
censed seamen must be U.S. citizens.25 Since the vessels were not depart-
ing a U.S. port, they were not required to employ U.S. mariners until
such time as the tankers return to a U.S. port, an unlikely eventuality.26
18. Statement of the Honorable John Gaughan, Maritime Administrator of the De-
partment of Transportation, before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee
(June 18, 1987). The address of Chesapeake is listed care of Prentice Hall Corporate Sys-
tems Inc., but Prentice Hall has been unable to supply any details of Chesapeake executives,
thus adding weight to the hypothesis that the company is little more than a shell. Seatrade
Week, May 15-21, 1987, at 2. In addition, Chesapeake does not manage the Kuwaiti tanker.
Instead, recruiting and other personnel matters are conducted by an outside company, Glen
Eagle Ship Management of Houston, Texas. Telephone Conversation with John Lovell,
President, Glen Eagle Ship Management (January 27, 1988).
19. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
20. Letter to Mr. Tim Stafford, Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, from J.C. Card, Cap-
tain, U.S. Coast Guard (May 21, 1987) [hereinafter May 21 Coast Guard Letter].
21. "Inspections, Manning Slow Kuwaiti Ship Reflagging," Journal of Commerce, June
1, 1987. All 11 vessels were inspected by June 15, 1987. "Labor Steps Up Heat on Kuwaiti
Tankers," Journal of Commerce, June 15, 1987. The first two tankers were cleared by the
U.S. Coast Guard on July 16, 1987. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1987, at B8, col. 6. Three more
ships were re-registered in August. N.Y. Times, August 3, 1987, at Al, col. 5; N.Y. Times,
August 9, 1987, at A12, col. 3.
22. Memorandum of Agreement Between Kuwait Oil Tanker Company and The
United States Coast Guard, signed by J.C. Card, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard (May 21, 1987),
and by the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (June 2, 1987).
23. Id. See also May 21 Coast Guard Letter, supra note 20, at 2. Under U.S. law, all
officers must be U.S. citizens, unless "for any reason deprived of (their) services" in which
case foreigners may be employed. This exception applies to all officers except for the master
who must be a U.S. citizen at all times. 46 U.S.C. §§ 7102 & 8103(a),(e) (Supp. II, 1984).
24. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1987, at A5, col. 1 (Representative Helen Bentley, Democrat
of Maryland, criticizing decision to use loophole in manning requirements).
25. 46 U.S.C. § 8103(b) (Supp. II, 1984).
26. The loophole in the regulations was closed by the passage of H.R. 2598 which was
adopted into law on January 11, 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-239. The new law requires that on
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After the Iraqi attack on the American frigate Stark, which killed 37
sailors, the U.S. Senate voted to block reflagging until the Reagan Admin-
istration could produce a report on how the newly-flagged ships would be
protected." The Reagan Administration therefore postponed implemen-
tation of the reflagging plan until it could determine what forces were
necessary to safely escort the vessels."8 An intricate plan which met the
requirements of the Senate was eventually developed, 29 and the first two
re-registered Kuwaiti tankers, accompanied by U.S. warships,"0 sailed
into the Persian Gulf on July 22, 1987.s '
III. STATE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE REFLAGGING DECISION
The scenario outlined above indicates that the decision to reflag the
Kuwaiti oil tankers is rather unique in that it was politically motivated,
rather than a product of economic factors. In a more common situation
such as the latter, an American ship might be reflagged by a state having
little or no connection to the ship in order to avoid stringent (and rela-
tively expensive) American labor laws, tax provisions, and safety regula-
tions.32 In the present case Kuwaiti ships were reflagged by the United
States, similarly with little or no connection to the vessels, for political
reasons.3" In both cases, however, the responsibilities of the flag-carrying
state to the world community are the same. In order to analyze the signif-
icance of the Kuwaiti reflagging under international law, this section first
examines the internationally-accepted criteria which must be met for
flagging a ship, and then attempts to determine whether the criteria were
met in the present case.
American-flagged vessels all licensed seamen, and 75% of all unlicensed seamen must be
U.S. citizens regardless of whether the ship calls on American ports. This provision means
that the Kuwaiti tankers must now be reviewed. Manning waivers still may be granted in
order to fulfill national defense interests.
27. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1987, at A3, col. 5.
28. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
29. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1987, at A12, col. 1.
30. A flag state has the right to protect its vessels from deprivation from other states.
A.D. Watts, The Protection of Merchant Ships, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 52, 56 (1957).
Whether this doctrine should necessarily be applicable in the present case is outside the
scope of this discussion.
31. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1987, at A14, col. 1.
32. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
33. While ships are generally reflagged for economic reasons, the practice of reflagging
for political reasons is not without precedents. During the war of 1812, American ships
sailed under the Portuguese flag in order to protect themselves from British warships block-
ading the American coast. Flags of Convenience-The 'Offshore' Registration of Ships, in
E. GOLD, NEw DIRECTIONS IN MARITIME LAW 85 (1978). Also, during Napoleon's continental
blockade, English vessels were registered under the colors of tiny German principalities to
avoid capture. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 8 (1962). More recently, in 1969, during the
Vietnam War, two former Taiwanese ships manned by Chinese crews were granted provi-
sional U.S. registry, but that reflagging was called off after protests from labor unions. See
Reflagging Battle Goes International, Journal of Commerce, June 15, 1987.
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A. Criteria for Establishing Nationality
The oft-used term "the nationality of ships" connotes a legal rela-
tionship between a vessel and a country unlike that found between either
a nation and any other tangible piece of property, or a nation and an
individual." It might better be termed a "pseudo-nationality" since the
relationship between a ship and a state differs markedly from those more
common relationships implied by the term "nationality. 3 5 This term is
misleading when applied to ships in that it seems to suggest that a ship is
subject to only one system of law-the law of the country in which it is
registered or whose flag it flies. It must, however, be remembered that a
ship is also a creature of international law, in that it is international law
which provides for or excludes the manifestation of sovereign power with
respect to ships.s6
Under international law, each state "whether coastal or not, has the
right to sail ships under its flag,"'8 7 and each state "may determine for
itself the conditions on which it will grant its nationality to a merchant
ship."3 " In general, there are only three limitations on the right to grant
nationality. First, a state may not grant nationality to a ship where doing
so would impinge upon the rights of other states. For example, a state is
not allowed to impose its nationality upon vessels that already have, and
desire to maintain, the nationality of another state. 9 Secondly, a state
will not be allowed to grant its nationality to a ship if there is reasonable
ground for suspicion that the ship will be used in violation of interna-
tional law. 0 Finally, a state must choose a single nationality for its
ships.4 A ship which sails under the flag of two or more states may not
lawfully claim any of the nationalities in question and, thus, may become
a ship without nationality." This is a particularly undesirable situation
because, under international law, ships without nationality may be
boarded by foreign warships.4 3
34. Anderson, Jurisdiction over Stateless Vessels on the High Seas: An Appraisal
Under Domestic and International Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 323, (1982).
35. BOCZEK, supra note 33, at 121.
36. For example, only warships and state owned or operated ships have complete im-
munity from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state. 1958 Geneva Convention
on the High Seas (hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention), art. 8(1) and (9), 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. See also O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
747 (1984).
37. The Barcelona Declaration, April 20, 1921, incorporating the Treaty of Versailles,
1919; in 1958 Convention, supra note 36, art. 4; 1982 Convention on the High Seas [herein-
after cited as 1982 Convention], art. 90, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 62/161, U.N. Public Sales No.
E.83.V.5.
38. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1983). See also Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL
LAW I, at 595 (8th ed., 1953).
39. BOCZEK, supra note 33, at 105-106.
40. Id.
41. 1982 Convention, supra note 37, art. 92(1).
42. 1958 Convention, supra note 36, art. 6.
43. A warship that encounters a foreign ship on the high seas may board such ship if
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Because a great deal of reliance is placed on the individual state to
promulgate its own criteria for granting nationality to a vessel, states usu-
ally have little difficulty in meeting the relatively minimal requirements
requisite for recognition of ship nationality under international law.
These requirements may be grouped under three headings: the flag, "gen-
uine link" and registration. As the discussion below indicates, the satis-
faction of only one of these criteria may be sufficient to establish nation-
ality under international law, depending on the situation.
1. The Flag
"The law of the flag" as used in the field of maritime law has often
been equated with the law arising out of a ship's nationality."44 This us-
age tends to place undue emphasis on the importance of the flag in the
determination of ship nationality. In actual practice, the flag of a ship is
less than conclusive evidence of a vessel's national affiliation. The flag is
simply the conventional way in which a vessel evidences its purported
endowment with a nationality."5 As such, the flag is generally accepted
under international law as prima facie evidence of this.4 It is not, how-
ever, conclusive proof.
2. "Genuine Link"
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas states that "there
must be a genuine link between the State and the ship."' 7 This test of
nationality was not new. A similar concept had been adopted as early as
1896 by the Institut de Droit Internationale. " ' The term "genuine link",
however, was borrowed directly from a decision of the International Court
there is reason to believe that the ship is without nationality. 1958 Convention, supra note
36, art. 22; see also Naim Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine, 1948 A.C. 351.
44. The enunciation of the principle that the law which governs the regulation of a
merchant ship on the high seas is "the law of the flag" first emerged in The Lamington, 87
F. 753 (1898). The "law of the flag" has been defined as "a concise phrase to express a
simple fact, namely the law of the country to which the ship belongs and whose flag she
bears." RIENow, supra note 2 at 5, citing Brantford City, 29 F. 383 (1886).
45. O'CONNELL, supra note 36 at 757.
46. The Chiquita, 19 F.2d 417, 418 (1927).
47. 1958 Convention, supra note 36, art. 5. The 1982 Convention, supra note 37, re-
peats this criterion in nearly identical language in art. 91(1):
Each state shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. States
have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must
exist a genuine link between the State and the ship. (emphasis added)
The rest of the provision pertaining to the nationality of ships simply provides: "Each state
shall issue to ships of which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that effect."
Art. 91(2).
48. In 1896 the Committee on Usage of National Flags for Merchant Ships agreed that
laws of certain countries concerning the nationality of ships ought not to dilute the criteria
which most states had adopted. The Rules adopted by the Institut provide that as a condi-
tion of registration, a ship should be at least one-half the property of nationals of the coun-
try of registry or of nationally-owned companies. O'CONNELL, supra note 36, at 758.
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of Justice holding that a state could refuse to recognize an individual's
nationality when there is an absence of a genuine link between an indi-
vidual and the state. In the Nottebohm Case49 the court reasoned:
. .nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of at-
tachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments,
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be
said to constitute the juridical expression of fact that the individual
upon whom it is conferred, either directly or as a result of an act of
the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population
of the State conferring nationality than with any other State."
The applicability of the court's holding in Nottebohm to cases involving
ship nationality is questionable, since the holding was explicitly limited in
scope to individuals.
The main problem with the application of the "genuine link" doc-
trine to ships is that frequently no concrete, exclusive connection can be
established between a ship and a state because the vessel may be owned
by a legal person, such as a multinational corporation, whose shareholders
may be of many different nationalities. 1 Despite this difficulty, the pro-
position that the concept of "genuine link" is common to the problem of
identifying people and ships arose in a dissenting opinion in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Judge Jessup, in his separate opinion to Barce-
lona Traction,2 wrote:
If a state purports to confer its nationality on ships by allowing them
to fly its flag, without assuming that they meet such tests as manage-
ment, ownership, jurisdiction, and control, other states are not bound
to recognize the asserted nationality of the ship. 3
The requirement is premised upon the belief that a state can carry out its
obligation to exercise control over its ship only if such a genuine link
exists.
The "genuine link" doctrine can be viewed as part of an international
effort to restrict "flags of convenience." 4 This phrase covers flagging and
49. Liechtenstein v. Guatamala, 1955 I.C.J. 1 (Nottebohm Case).
50. Id.
51. Boczek argues that the Nottebohm principle simply is unworkable when applied to
ships. BOCZEK, supra note 33, at 122. He also contends that the requirement of certainty is
much more important with respect to ships than with respect to individuals. Id. at 123.
Nottebohm has been criticized for increasing uncertainty in international affairs. See Jones,
The Nottebohm Case, 5 INT'L & COM. L. Q. 230, 244 (1956).
52. Case Concerning The Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited,
1970 I.C.J. 4.
53. Id. at 188.
54. "Flags of convenience" have also been called four other names: (1) They have been
termed "flags of necessity" by shipowners who argue that such flags are essential in order to
operate competitively. N.Y.Times, April 11, 1958, at A47; E.B. Shils and S. Miller, Foreign
Flags on U.S. Ships: Convenience or Necessity?, 2 INDus. REL. 131 (1963). (2) They have
been termed "flags of survival" by military personnel who contend that they are necessary
for military purposes. N.Y.Times, June 21, 1961, at A10, col.l. (3) They have been called
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registration of ships in a country with which they otherwise have little or
no connection in order to take advantage of that country's favorable laws
and regulations. Although there is no specific reference to "flags of conve-
nience" in the 1958 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea," the debates
and proceedings of the conference indicate that they were aimed at con-
trolling such vessels. 6 Advocates of the "genuine link" doctrine fre-
quently tie their arguments to attacks upon flags of convenience."
Liberia, Panama, Singapore, and Cyprus are most often cited as cul-
prits as regards flags of convenience.5 8 While each of these nations offers
different advantages to ship owners, six features which they have in com-
mon are: (1) access to registry is easy and inexpensive; (2) the country of
registry allows owner-ship and/or control of its merchant vessels by non-
citizens, and the owner enjoys almost complete secrecy of operations; (3)
collective labor agreements are absent and there are no wage reporting
requirements; (4) taxes on the income from the ships are not levied or are
low; (5) manning of ships by non-nationals is freely permitted; (6) the
country of registry does not have the power to impose international regu-
lations upon vessels flying its flag.89
The title to a vessel which flies a flag of convenience is often held by
a "paper" company incorporated under the laws of the nation of regis-
try. ° Individuals and companies in other countries, however, are the ben-
eficial owners, receiving the profits and advantages while bearing little or
"runaway flags" by maritime unions who describe such registration practices as attempts to
run away from U.S. labor laws. Statement of Executive Secretary of AFL-CIO, in Study of
Vessel Transfer, Trade-in and Reserve Fleet Policies: Hearings Before the Sub-committee
on the Merchant Marine, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 685, 694 (1957). (4) More recently, they have
been termed "open registry fleets." UNCTAD adopts this terminology. See UNCTAD Sec-
retariat, Economic Consequences of the Existence of a Lack of a Genuine Link Between
Vessel and Flag of Registry, UNCTAD Doc. TB/B/C.4/168, at 53 (1977). [hereinafter cited
as UNCTAD Report on Economic Consequences]. The term "open," however, inaccurately
implies access and disclosure. Ship owners choose flags of convenience specifically because
they allow secrecy of operations. Thus such flags cannot be characterized as "open." For this
reason, and because "flags of convenience" is the most common term, "flags of convenience"
will be used throughout this discussion.
55. 1958 Convention, supra note 36.
56. E. Osieke, Flags of Convenience Vessels: Recent Developments, 73 AMER. J. INT'L
L. 604, 606 (1979).
57. For example, the 1984 Soviet Yearbook of Maritime Law argues: "Taking into ac-
count the widespread practice of 'flags of convenience' it is high time to establish more
concrete inter-national law principles to ensure genuine jurisdiction of the flag State over
each ship flying its flag in administrative, technical and social matters." 1984 SOVIET Y.B.
MAR. L. 39.
58. See OECD Maritime Transport Committee, Flags of Convenience, reprinted in
ILO Doc. JMC/21/4 (1972). For historical background on flags of convenience, see generally
R. CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PANAMANIAN AND
LIBERIAN FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE (1981), and BOCZEK, supra note 33, at 26-63.
59. The listing was taken, in part, from a United Kingdom inquiry into shipping.
Committee of Inquiry into Shipping, Report 51 (1970) [Rochdale Committee Report].
60. An UNCTAD report calls these companies "brass plate companies." Action on the
Question of Open Registry, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/C.4/220 (March 3, 1980).
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no responsibility for the problems arising from daily operations. Opera-
tors of ships flying a flag of convenience can often avoid public inquiry
and prosecution because they reside outside the flag state and have no
assets there. If their identity becomes known, they can erase their bad
reputation by simply changing the name of their company or ship."' In
1980, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) produced a report analyzing the true beneficial owners of
ships with this type of registry."2 According to the report, about one-third
of all tonnage considered to be sailing under a flag of convenience is con-
trolled by U.S. interests.
Both UNCTAD and the International Labor Conference (ILO)13 sup-
port the "genuine link" doctrine as a means of restricting "flag-of-conve-
nience" (or open-registry) fleets. UNCTAD contends that the expansion
of open-registry fleets has adversely affected the development and com-
petitiveness of fleets of countries which do not offer open-registry provi-
sions, and has endangered the orderly and safe development of interna-
tional trade."' In contrast, the international labor movement opposes flags
of convenience because safety and labor conditions aboard such ships are
extremely poor. 5 In support of both claims, commentators have
presented data indicating that fleets operating under a flag of conve-
nience are more likely to suffer serious losses at sea.6 As an example,
consider that according to Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Greece, Liberia
61. Sinan, supra note 4 at 103.
62. UNCTAD Report, supra note 60.
63. The ILO seeks to promote higher labor standards in international merchant ship-
ping. See F.L. Wiswall, The ILO at Sea, 3 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 153, 154 (1970).
64. See Conditions for the Registration of Ships, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/AC (Jan. 22,
1982), reprinted in 4 OCEAN Y.B. 492 (Borgese and Ginsburg, eds. 1982). UNCTAD would
require that states adopt an internationally acceptable and agreed definition of what consti-
tutes a genuine link. UNCTAD Report on Economic Consequences, supra note 54, at 5, 7
and 12.
65. The ILO has actively opposed flags of convenience since 1933. E. Argiroffo, Flags
of Convenience and Substandard Vessels: A Review of the ILO's Approach to the Problem,
110 INT'L LAB. REV. 437, 439 (1974). The ILO has adopted two international labor recom-
mendations concerning the enforcement of safety laws, social security measures abd stan-
dards of competency aboard vessels which fly flags of convenience: the Seafarer's Recom-
mendation (No. 107) and the Social Conditions and Safety Recommendation (No. 108). Id.,
at 446-455. International maritime unions have challenged flags of convenience through
strikes, boycotts and legislative action. See e.g., Ewing, Union Action Against Flags of Con-
venience-The Legal Position in Great Britain, 11 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 503 (1980); Note, 16
J. MAR. L. & COM. 423 (1985) [strike by the International Transport Workers Federation
against flag-of-convenience ship held unlawful]; Note, The Effect of United States Labor
Legislation on the Flag of Convenience Fleet, 69 YALE L. J. 498, 502-503 (1969) [U.S. mari-
time unions oppose flags of convenience].
66. See U.S. Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard, Technical
Memorandum No. MMI-3, 866-5-1 (March 29, 1986); S. Bergstrand and R. Doganis, The
Impact of Flags of Convenience, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING: AN-
GLO-SOvIET POST-UNCLOS PERSPECTIVE 421-424 (W.E. Butler, ed. 1985); Transportation
Institute Memorandum, The Safety of U.S.-Flag Ships Compared to Flag of Convenience
Ships, (October 19, 1977).
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and Panama together accounted for 40.93% of the losses at sea in 1984.67
Disasters caused by ships with this type of registry have increased
public awareness of the dangers presented by flags of convenience. In
1978, the Amoco Cadiz, a tanker registered in Liberia, spilled nearly all of
its 230,000 tons of light crude oil onto the high seas and the French coast
in Brittany." Eleven years earlier, the Torrey Canyon, another flag of
convenience ship, spilled half of its cargo of 117,000 tons of Kuwaiti oil on
the beaches of Brittany and Cornwall. 9 The United States is not without
its own share of tragedies. The Liberian-flagged Argo Merchant broke
apart off Nantucket in December, 1976, spilling 7.5 million gallons of oil
into New England fishing waters.7 1
Ironically, these disasters have prompted international organizations
to move away from attempts to directly prohibit flags of convenience. In-
stead, the international community has focused upon the problems aris-
ing under the operations of substandard vessels"1 generally, regardless of
whether they sail under flags of convenience.7 2 For example, both the
1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 7 and the 1969 International Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage7 4 were prompted by the
Torrey Canyon incident.75
Unfortunately, the use of the genuine link doctrine to limit the num-
ber of vessels flying flags of convenience has failed to have significant in-
fluence upon the maritime industry. There has been no consensus among
states that the provisions of Article 5 of the Geneva Convention on the
High Seas should govern their relations in determining the nationality of
ships.7 6 Flag-of-convenience fleets have expanded rapidly7 7 and presently
67. SAMIR MANKABADY, THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION: ACCIDENTS AT
SEA 27 (1987) [hereinafter cited as MANKABADY, IMO VOL. 2].
68. The Sunday Times (London), March 19, 1978, at 1, col.1 and 2, col. 2.
69. The Torrey Canyon disaster caused 18 million dollars worth of damages. A. Men-
delsohn, The Public Interest and Private International Maritime Law, 10 WM. & MARY
L.R. 783, 788 (1969). See also Brown, The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon, 21 CURRENT LE-
GAL PROBS. 134 (1968).
70. The Transportation Institute, Flags of Convenience: An American View, at 1
(1978).
71. The term "sub-standard" ships refers to those of unsound structure, ill equipped,
badly operated, or having incompetent crews. It is estimated that 5% of the world's tanker
fleet could be termed sub-standard. MANKABADY, IMO VOL.2, supra note 69, at 35, n.2.
72. Osieke, supra note 56, at 626.
73. 64 A.J.I.L. 471 (1970) [convention affirms the right of coastal states to take such
measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate, or eliminate danger, or
threat of danger to coastline; provides provisions for settling disputes by means of negotia-
tions, conciliation, and arbitration].
74. Id. at 481 (placing liability on the owner of the ship transporting oil).
75. See Mendelsohn, supra note 69.
76. Osieke, supra note 56, at 607.
77. See THE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING FEDERATION, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL SHIP REG-
ISTERS (1987) [hereinafter cited as ISF GUIDE]; See also Transportation Institute Transport
Studies Group Discussion Paper No.8, Flags of Convenience in 1978, at 3-24 (November,
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Liberia and Panama, two of the worst flag-of-convenience offenders, com-
mand the largest merchant fleets in the worlds.7 Fleets operating under
flags of convenience now account for one-third of the world's tanker ton-
nage as well as one-third of the world's bulk oil carriers.7 9 This demon-
strates that the "genuine link" doctrine is, at least in its traditional form,
widely ignored.
Perhaps states find the "genuine link" requirement so easy to ignore
because the U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea"0 contain no provi-
sions indicating the consequences of registration when no genuine link
exists. In fact, the Conventions do not enable a state to withhold recogni-
tion if it believes that no link exists. Article 94(6) of the Law of the Sea
merely provides that a state "which has clear grounds to believe that a
proper jurisdiction and control with respect to a ship have not been exer-
cised may report the facts to the flag state," which has a duty to investi-
gate.8' Also, the "genuine link" requirement may be avoided because it
not defined. Even though early drafts of the International Law Commis-
sion attempted to define "genuine link," by requiring ownership by na-
tionals and manning by national officers,82 the final draft failed to do so.
The International Court of Justice has also failed to actively support
the "genuine link" requirement. It declined to apply the Nottebohm8 3
principle to ships when the opportunity arose in the IMCO Case.84 In
IMCO, the Court advised that Liberia and Panama should be eligible for
membership in the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmen-
tal Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).85 The Court reasoned
that the term "largest ship-owning nations" in Article 28(a) of the IMCO
Convention referred to registered tonnage and not beneficially owned ton-
nage. After the IMCO opinion, there can be little doubt that irrespective
of ownership, registration alone is sufficient to determine the nationality
of ships as far as international law is concerned.88
U.S. courts similarly have rejected a "genuine link" test which would
define nationality by ownership. For example, in Grivas v. Alianza Com-
1978).
78. Important statistical data on the major merchant fleets of the world, as of July 1,
1986, are summarized in 31 ALMANAC OF SEAPOWER 235 (1988).
79. GOLD, supra note 33, at 89. See also LLOYD'S REGISTER OF SHIPPING (1987).
80. See 1958 Convention, supra note 36, art. 52; 1982 Convention, supra note 37, art.
91.
81. 1982 Convention, supra note 37, art. 94(6).
82. 1951 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 330-32; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/4 Ser. A/1953.
83. See Nottebohm Case. supra note 49.
84. 1960 I.C.J. 150.
85. In 1982, the IMCO became known as the International Maritime Organization
(IMO). SAMIR MANKABADY, THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 2 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MANKABADY, IMO VOL.1].
86. A similar observation was made in Sinan, supra note 4, at 98. However, Sinan
wrote that "the flag determines the responsibility of states as far as the enforcement of
international law is concerned." As stated, Sinan's observation is misleading because the flag
alone does not establish nationality. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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pania Armadora, S.A.,"7 the ship was registered in Liberia but owned by
a Panamanian corporation. The plaintiffs sought to have the Panamanian
Labor Code applied. The court, however, rejected jurisdiction by owner-
ship, concluding that the fact that the vessel was owned by a Panamanian
corporation did not in itself entitle the crew to the benefits of the Pana-
manian Labor Code. 8
While at least some Eastern European states require a "genuine
link"' in its traditional sense, most states do not follow the same prac-
tice. In fact, only one of the elements that has been traditionally thought
to establish a genuine link for purposes of ship nationality has been con-
sistently required under international law-registration. The use of the
place of the vessel's construction to establish a link has become, for all
practical purposes, anachronistic.9 0 While many states have some man-
ning requirements, evidence of a national crew is neither necessary nor
sufficient to establish nationality. Similarly, as the IMCO Case demon-
strates,9 2 there is no necessary correlation between ownership and nation-
ality.93 Registration, accompanied by the appropriate documents, is the
only "genuine link" required to establish nationality under international
law.
3. Registration
Registration falls within the jurisdiction of the individual nation,
and, therefore, requirements and procedures for this process vary from
87. 150 F.Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
88. Id. at 712. For a similar case, see Evangelinos v. Andreavapor Compania Naviera,
S.A., 162 F.Supp 520, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In holding that foreign seamen aboard flag-of-
convenience ships were not entitled to the protection of U.S. labor laws, the U.S. Supreme
Court further rejected an ownership test in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros,
372 U.S. 10, 83 S.Ct. 614, 9 L.Ed.2d 541 (1963) and in Incres S.S. Co. v. Int'l Maritime
Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24, 83 S.Ct. 611, 9 L.Ed.2d 557 (1963) (seamen not entitled to
protection of Labor Management Relations Act, although 40% of the vessels were owned by
Americans and these ships carried one-third of the United State's foreign trade in 1958).
See Currie, Flags of Convenience: American Labor and the Conflict of Laws, 1963 SuP. CT.
REV. 34.
89. The Soviet Union requires a substantial link in order to sail under Soviet national-
ity. Under Soviet law, the right to fly a USSR flag is granted to vessels owned by the state,
by collective farms or other state cooperative organizations, or by Soviet nationals. Upon
registration, vessels are issued papers attesting the right to sail under the flag of the USSR.
Only Soviet nationals may be crew members aboard Soviet-flagged ships, except under ex-
traordinary circumstances. BuTLER, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 174 (1971),
citing articles 22, 23, 26, 30-33 and 41 of the Merchant Shipping Code of the USSR.
90. RIENOW, supra note 2, at 24-49.
91. Id. at 216. States continue to have manning requirements for economic reasons (to
promote employment for nationals) and for military reasons.
92. 1960 I.C.J. 150; see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
93. Rienow states: "[T]he bare fact of national ownership does not impress upon a
vessel a closer connection with the state of the owner's nationality than with any other
state." RIENOW, supra note 2, at 116.
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state to state."' Most states make general disclosure requirements regard-
ing such things as the ownership of the vessel, the type of the vessel and
its exact specifications, the age of the vessel, and its inspection history."5
It is commonly recognized that it is the act of registration which results
in the granting of a flag to a vessel.
Early treaties expressly stipulate the particular conditions under
which parties would recognize the nationality of each other's vessels.9" On
the other hand, more recent treaties provide for reciprocal flag recogni-
tion on the basis of valid registration documents. The United States'
standard flag recognition clause today reads:
Vessels under the flag of either party, and carrying the papers re-
quired by its law in proof of nationality, shall be deemed to be vessels
of that party both on the high seas and within its ports, places and
waters of the other party.
9 7
The U.S.S.R. uses similar language in its treaties:
The nationality of vessels shall be reciprocally recognized in accor-
dance with the law and enactments of the two contracting parties on
the basis of the documents and certificates on board the vessel issued
by the proper authorities of either contracting parties.98
Under both of the texts, the focus is upon registration. No reference is
made to the question of who owns the ship, by which country's nationals
it is manned, or where it was built.9'
In the absence of a treaty, under international law evidence of regis-
tration is both necessary and sufficient to establish nationality. 100 The
U.S. Code of Regulations specifically recognizes that a certificate of docu-
mentation is "conclusive evidence of nationality for international pur-
94. For a comparison of the registration requirements of the United States, Liberia,
and Panama, see E. GOLD & N.G. LETALIK, NEW DIRECTIONS IN MARITIME LAW 262-290
(1980) (reprinting sections of each country's statutes pertaining to registration of ships).
95. For a review of U.S. documentation procedures, see Drzal and Camilla, Documen-
tation of Vessels: The Fog Lifts, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 261 (1982).
96. For flag recognition clauses in bilateral treaties up to 1937, see RIENOW, supra note
2, at 19-21 and 167-170.
97. BOCZEK, supra note 33, at 98, n. 23, citing, e.g. treaties of FCN: With China, Nov.
4, 1946, art. XXI, 63 Stat. (2) 1299; T.I.A.S. 1871, 2 U.N.T.S. 69. With Italy, Feb. 2, 1947,
art. XIX; 63 Stat. (2)2255; T.I.A.S. 1965; 79 U.N.T.S. 171. With Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, art.
XVIII(2); 1 U.S.T. 785; T.I.A.S. 2155. With Japan, April 2, 1953, art. XIX; 4 U.S.T. 2063;
T.I.A.S. 2863. With Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, art. XIX; 5 U.S.T. 50; T.I.A.S. 2948.
98. Id.
99. It is interesting to note that the U.S. has flag recognition provisions with Honduras
and Liberia, two of the main flag of convenience states. These provisions were one of the
main arguments put forward by some of the International Law Commission against making
recognition of a vessel's nationality dependent upon a "genuine link." BOCZEK, supra note
33, at 99, n.26, citing Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Consular Rights with Honduras,
December 7, 1927, art. X; 45 Stat. 2618; T.S. 764; 87 L.N.T.S. 421. Treaty of FCN with
Liberia, August 8, 1938, art. XV; 54 Stat. 1739; T.S. 956; 201 L.N.T.S. 163.
100. N. SINGH, MARITIME FLAG AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (1977); BOCZEK, supra note
33, at 106; RIENOW, supra note 2, at 154.
VOL. 17:1
NATIONALITY OF SHIPS AND INT'L RESPONSIBILITY
poses."' 0' A ship without documents to establish nationality is treated as
being without nationality, even if the ownership of the vessel may be es-
tablished.' 3 Thus, the country of registration remains the single, essential
criterion for determining the nationality of a ship.
B. Was the Re-registration of the Kuwaiti Tankers Sufficient to Confer
U.S. Nationality?
According to the criteria discussed above, the Kuwaiti tankers need
only be properly registered under U.S. law in order to legally sail under
the American flag. Under international law, if the Kuwaiti vessels carry
documentation evidencing American registration, issued by competent
authorities, then they are to be considered American ships. This rela-
tively minor requirement was met in the present case.
Under U.S. law, vessels of at least 5 net tons'03 are eligible for docu-
mentation if two main requirements are met. First, the vessels must meet
the inspection requirements provided by the Coast Guard.'0 4 This re-
quirement was-satisfied because U.S. law also allows violations to be
waived if national defense concerns are present.105 The Coast Guard in-
spected each ship on site'" and granted national defense waivers for vio-
lations of U.S. law that did not constitute "manifestly unsafe
conditions. ' '1107
Second, the vessels must meet ownership requirements. In order to
trade overseas, 108 a vessel must be owned by an individual who is a U.S.
citizen, partnership whose general partners are U.S. citizens, or corpora-
tion organized and chartered under the laws of the United States.' 9 If
101. 46 U.S.C. § 12104(1) (1987) provides that while a certificate of documentation
issued under U.S. laws is conclusive evidence of nationality for international purposes, it is
not conclusive evidence in any proceeding conducted under the laws of the U.S.
102. See, e.g., The Merritt, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 582, 587 (1873) (American-owned, for-
eign-built ship without any documents could not establish nationality and thus was "en-
tirely destitute").
103. 46 U.S.C. § 12102 (1987).
104. 46 U.S.C. § 3301 - et. seq. (1987). 46 U.S.C. § 3705 (1987) details specific stan-
dards applicable to oil tankers. In addition, regulations have been issued pursuant to 46
U.S.C. § 3306 (1987). U.S. Coast Guard Navigation and Inspection Circular No. 10-81, dated
October 5, 1981, contains the requirements for foreign flag vessel brought under the U.S.
flag.
105. Such waivers are granted under 46 C.F.R. § 6.01.(1987) and 46 App. U.S.C. Note
prec. 1 (1958) (Act of December 27, 1950). See supra notes 12-15, and accompanying text.
106. N. Y. Times, July 17, 1987, at B8, col. 6; N. Y. Times, August 9, 1987, at A12,
col. 3.
107. May 21 Coast Guard Letter, supra note 20.
108. The distinction between overseas trade and coastal trade is crucial because the
Shipping Act of 1916 independently imposes further requirements concerning the citizen-
ship of owners of vessels engaged in coastal trade. 46 U.S.C. §§ 802 & 808 (1959). See Drzal
& Carnilla, supra note 95 at 265. In addition, vessels which engage in coastal trade must be
built in the United States. On the other hand, ships engaging in foreign trade may be built
anywhere. 46 U.S.C. § 12105(d) (1987).
109. 46 U.S.C. § 12102 (1987). In comparison, under Panamanian law, there are no
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the vessel is owned by a corporation, the chief executive officer, chairman
of the board of directors, and a majority of the directors must be U.S.
citizens. 1 ' The equity ownership in a U.S. flag vessel registered for for-
eign trade need not be held by American citizens unless the United States
is at war, or the President has declared a national emergency. Were that
to be the case, a majority of the interest in the corporation would have to
be owned by Americans."'
The Kuwaiti government satisfied the ownership requirement by es-
tablishing a "paper corporation," Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., to act upon
its behalf."2 The equity interest in Chesapeake Shipping is not owned by
Americans. This is not a fatal defect because, while the Administration
was seeking waiver of inspection rules based on "national defense," it did
not go so far as to declare a "national emergency." A House of Represent-
atives report analyzing this problem noted that "[a] 'national emergency'
declaration would trigger a shift in equity ownership of the Kuwaiti tank-
ers."" 3 Under the present circumstances, however, Chesapeake Shipping
is in apparent compliance with the ownership requirement.
In sum, because the Kuwaiti tankers met the United States's require-
ments for registration, they were properly issued certificates of documen-
tation."" The fact that the Kuwaiti tankers have little connection to the
United States is irrelevant. Under international law, these certificates of
documentation are conclusive evidence of nationality." 5 Thus, the vessels
had the right to carry the U.S. flag.
IV. STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SAILING OF FLAGGED VESSELS
Every state has the right to have ships fly its flag on the high seas.""
However, all rights of an international character involve international re-
sponsibility. Consideration for the rights of other states requires that flag
states observe international rules relating to environmental protection,
the protection of human life at sea, and safety in navigation." 7 The vast
majority of states, including many of those associated with fleets sailing
under flags of convenience, agree that they have a general obligation to
sail safe ships."' This general acknowledgement is evidenced by the fact
ownership requirements. GOLD & LETALIK, supra note 94, at 282.
110. 46 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (1987).
111. House Memorandum, supra note 9, at 11.
112. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
113. House Memorandum, supra note 9, at 11. The Report further observed that "[i]t
may be possible that invoking the War Powers Act, as Congress has asked, would be tanta-
mount to declaring a national emergency."
114. 46 U.S.C. § 12103 (1987) (certificates of documentation).
115. Supra note 100 and accompanying text.
116. 1982 Convention, supra note 37, art. 87.
117. Limitone, The Registration of Ships by International and International Organi-
zation, 2 SEA GRANT BULLETIN 4-5 (1971).
118. See Transportation Institute discussion paper No. 8, supra note 77, at 58. For
evidence of the international emphasis placed upon safety of life at sea, see Law of the Sea,
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that the largest fleets which are considered to fly flags of convenience,
including those of Panama, Liberia and Cyprus, have ratified the key in-
ternational conventions pertaining to safety at sea."9
While it is perhaps difficult to point to precise, uniform safety obliga-
tions, the norm of sailing safe ships is not completely devoid of concrete
content. Rather, the duties arising out of this norm are set forth both in
multilateral conventions and through customary international law. Obli-
gations articulated in conventions and the customary rules of navigation
and safety attempt to regulate the use of the seas. " ° The flag state's fail-
ure to comply with the requirements of the conventions and customary
laws could conceivably make them liable internationally to injured
states.' 2 ' The interrelationship of these specific sources of the law of the
sea creates a general obligation to sail safe ships.'2 2 This section details
states' obligations in sailing vessels and determines whether such obliga-
tions were met with respect to the Kuwaiti oil tankers.
A. Obligations of State Sailing a Flagged Vessel
The obligations of states sailing flagged vessels arise out of a basic
principle of the law of the sea: freedom of the sea.'23 In recognition of the
sovereign equality of states, "all nations have an equal right to the unin-
terrupted use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for navigation."'2 "
The doctrine, as it has evolved through custom, is contained in Article 87
Report of the Secretary-General, November 27, 1985, U.N. Doc. A/40/923 (1985), reprinted
in 1 INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. DOCUMENTS ON OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, at Part A (J.N. Moore
ed. 1986).
119. Panama, Liberia, Isle of Man, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Malta, Vanuatu and Singa-
pore have all ratified the U.N. Convention for Safety of Life at Sea. ISF Guide, supra note
77. In addition, Liberia, Hong Kong, Cyprus and the Bahamas have adopted the Interna-
tional Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping. Id. See infra
note 155 and accompanying text.
120. Limitone, supra note 117, at 5.
121. Id., citing McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 2, at 1081-82. The main international
convention pertaining to liability for maritime claims is The International Convention relat-
ing to the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships, October 10, 1957, entry into force, 1968
U.N.T.S. 52; reprinted in SINGH, 4 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW CONVENTIONS 2976 (1983)
(hereinafter cited as Singh Conventions). For a discussion on the potential liability of flag
states, see MANKABADY, IMO VOL. 2, supra note 67, at 68-115.
122. Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga has noted that one of the principle features of the
lawmaking process in contemporary international law is the simultaneous interplay of its
sources. EDUARDO JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA, International Law in the Past Third of a Century,
1978 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1 (vol. 1).
123. See 1984 SovIr Y.B. MAR. L. 32; TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL MARINE ORDER
2 (Laursen, ed. 1982); P.S. RAO, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF OCEAN RESOURCES: A CRITIQUE OF
THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA 154-156 (1975)(Freedom of the seas and conflicting
uses); SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL REVOLUTIONS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 7 (M. Frankowska,
ed. 1974); McDougal & Burke, Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspective v.
National Egotism, 67 YALE L. J. 539, 547 (1958)(compromise between demands of coastal
and non-coastal states).
124. Le Louis, 2 Dod. Adm'y Rep. 210, 244 (1817).
1988
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states:
The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down
by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It com-
promises, inter alia, for both coastal and land-locked states:
(a) Freedom of navigation;
(b) Freedom of overflight;
(c) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines...
(d) Freedom to construct artificial island...
(e) Freedom of fishing...
(f) Freedom of scientific research. 125
The Convention emphasizes that freedom of the high seas must be exer-
cised "with due consideration for the interests of other States in their
exercise of freedom of the high seas...
If freedom of the high seas is to exist, it is necessary that interna-
tional rules are followed in order to alleviate conflicting or dangerous uses
of the oceans. International cooperation is more necessary today because
shipping has become an industry which greatly effects the quality of life
of the world community. One commentator succinctly noted: "Shipping is
no longer a personal affair dependent upon a brave captain. 1' 27 The large
fleets of today carry a considerably larger amount of dangerous cargo
than did the ships of yesterday. As a result, the problem of safety at sea
has expanded from the concern for the well-being of a few to concern for
safety of the entire human race.
The number of disasters at sea are astonishing. According to Lloyd's
Register of Shipping, in 1984 marine losses amounted to 161 vessels, a
total of 2.3 million tons gross.128 Between 1968 and 1980, over 1,593 lives
were lost at sea due to shipping disasters. 29 These numbers do not reveal
the true dimensions of the problem. Disasters at sea have a much wider
impact when social, economic, and ecological factors are taken into ac-
count. Professors McDougal and Burke have noted that it is in states'
self-interest to cooperate with others in the use of the oceans. They write
that:
States concerned for their long-term national interest might be better
advised not to destroy their equality of access to inclusive uses of the
oceans, but to increase their effective capacity for the fuller enjoyment
of their common existing rights.2 '
125. 1982 Convention, supra note 37, art., 87(1) (items (c) through (f) are subject to
limitations set forth in the Convention).
126. Id. art. 87(2).
127. MANKABADY, IMO VOL. 1, supra note 85, at 174.
128. MANKABADY, IMO VOL. 2, supra note 67, at 27.
129. Id. at 175.
130. McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 123, at 589.
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Without international cooperation, the problems of safety at sea cannot
be solved or even substantially reduced.'3 In an attempt to alleviate this
problem, states have set forth safety obligations in both international and
domestic regulations.
1. International Standards
The starting point for determining the content of international
norms pertaining to safety at sea is the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, 132 the basic source of international law of the sea.'33 The provi-
sions of the Convention have been grouped into three categories:
(1) provisions that codify or restate the existing law of the sea, either
customary or conventional; (2) provisions that clarify, redefine or
make more precise what has already been implicit in international law
or related developments; and (3) new, unique or unprecedented
provisions." 4
Which provisions fall into each category is often a subject of contro-
versy.131 Still, the main provision relating to the responsibilities of flag
states, Article 94, merely restates previously existing principles which are
corollary to the long-standing principle of freedom of the seas."' Such
131. For agreement with this proposition, see MANKABADY, IMO VOL. 1, supra note 85,
at 176.
132. The U.N. Conventions have a long history. First, the League of Nations produced
the Acts of the Conference for the Codification of International Law on August, 19, 1930.
Minutes of the Second Committee, League of Nations Conference for the Codification of
International Law Vol. IV, Doc. C. 351 (b). M. 145 (b). 1930 V (1930); reprinted in 24 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 234-53 (supp. 1930). The United Nations held the First Conference on the Law of
the Sea in 1958 and adopted the Convention on the High Seas. 1958 Convention, supra note
36. This Convention has been substantially revised twice, first in 1960 and, most recently, in
1982. See Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Final Act of Conference, April 26,
1960, UNCLOS III, OFFIcIAL RECORDS 175, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.19/L.15 (1960); 1982 Con-
vention, supra note 37.
For a convenient summary of the issues surrounding UNCLOS III, see G. M. White,
Unclos and the Modern Law of Treaties: Selected Issues, in W.B. BUTLER, THE LAW OF THE
SEA AND INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING: ANGLO - SOVIET POST UNCLOS PERSPECTIVE 15-37 (1985).
133. Many commentators agree that apart from provisions concerning the utilization
of the seabed and possibly those related to dispute resolution, UNCLOS is the best evidence
of the current state of customary international law. J. N. Moore, Customary International
Law After the Convention, in THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, THE DEVELOPING ORDER OF
THE OCEANS, at 41 (1984). See also Bruce Harlow, Commentary, id. at 62; BUTLER, supra
note 132, at 3-14. For a discussion of the deep seabed mining controversy that has caused
conflicts in Third U.N Conference on the Law of the Sea, see PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. POLICY
TOWARD THE LAW OF THE SEA: PRELUDE TO THE FINAL SESSION OF THE THIRD U.N. CONFER-
ENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (C.L.O. Buderi, D.D. Caron, eds. 1985).
134. T. Treves, The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention of 1982: Prospects for
Europe, in GREENWICH FORUM, BRITAIN AND THE SEA: FUTURE DEPENDENCE, FUTURE OPPOR-
TUNITIES 6 (1983).
135. Id. at 5-6.
136. Notably, this provision was accepted without controversy at the U.N. Law of the
Sea Conferences. Instead, disputes have focused on the question of fishing zones, seabed
mining, and the limits of the territorial sea. See CLYDE SANGER, ORDERING THE OCEANS: THE
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principles are reflected in numerous treaties and have been adopted by
many states. Therefore, Article 94 may be regarded as falling into either
the first or second category.'
Article 94 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea enumerates
the administrative, technical, and social matters over which the flag state
should exercise effective control. In particular, the Convention states:
Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are
necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to:
(a) The construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships;
(b) The manning of ships, labor conditions and the training of crews,
taking into account the applicable international instruments;
(c) The use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the
prevention of collisions."'
The flag state also must ensure that each vessel is surveyed by a qualified
surveyor of ships, that each ship is in the charge of a master who pos-
sesses the proper qualifications, and that the crew is appropriate in quali-
fications and in number.' 9 In fulfilling the requirement of Article 94,
each state is required to "conform to generally accepted international
regulations."' 4
0
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea has had a profound ef-
fect both upon conventional and customary international law pertaining
to safety.1 4' Guided by the Convention, the Intergovernmental Maritime
Organization (IMO)"42 has promoted several maritime safety measures
MAKING OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 13-22, 40-55 (1987). The United States has taken the posi-
tion that virtually every provision outside the seabed mining section is already customary
law and, thus, needs no convention or treaty to add to the body of international law. Id. at
106. While the United State's position has met with great opposition, many states do agree
that the sections pertaining to state responsibilities and freedom of the high seas are part of
customary international law. Tullio Treves, The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as
a Non-Universally Accepted Instrument: Notes on the Convention and Customary Law, in
A.W. KOERS & B.H. OXMAN, THE 1982 CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 685 (1983).
137. Treves, supra note 136, at 688. The implication of this observation is that not all
states have to sign the latest Convention on the Law of the Sea for Article 94 to become
binding on all states. As of this writing, the 1982 Convention has been signed by a sizable
number of states, but ratified by only a few. Id. at 685. The phenomenon of rules set forth
in a treaty becoming binding on third states as customary rules of international law is recog-
nized by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Art.38) and the International
Court of Justice in North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 41.
138. 1982 Convention, supra note 37, art. 94(3).
139. 1982 Convention, supra note 37, art. 94(4). See also the 1958 Convention, supra
note 36, especially Articles 5, 10, and 12.
140. 1982 Convention, supra note 37, art. 94(5).
141. See Budislav Vukas, The Impact of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea on Customary Law, in THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA (C.L. Rozakis & C.A.
Stephanou, eds. 1983).
142. The IMO is an agency of the U.N. which promotes the safety of maritime ship-
ping through three different instruments: conventions, resolutions and codes. Only conven-
tions, when ratified, are binding. Nevertheless, in practice, resolutions may carry more
weight than certain conventions, and some of the codes are incorporated into national law.
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which have found a very great measure of acceptance. An international
conference convened under its auspices adopted the International Con-
vention and Regulations for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 4 3 which
contains detailed provisions about the minimum standards for construc-
tion of ships and the safety precautions to be maintained on board. The
Convention also details inspection procedures, grants authority to flag
states to investigate any casualty involving their ships, and authorizes
port states to prevent ships not meeting the Convention's standards from
leaving their ports. The Convention has been ratified by most of the ma-
jor shipping nations including Panama, Cyprus, Liberia, USSR, Greece
and the United States.1
4 4
A set of safety regulations which has gained even greater acceptance
are the IMO's Collision Regulations ("The Rules")." 5 The Rules have
been adopted by 95 countries, the aggregate of whose merchant fleets
constitute approximately 95% of the gross tonnage of the world's
merchant fleet. s14 The Regulations consist of 38 detailed requirements ap-
plying to steering, sailing, lighting and sound and light signals. The Rules'
primary objective is to prevent accidents by minimizing the risk of colli-
sion, and their secondary objective is to set up standards of conduct for
navigating officers.14 These objectives can be achieved only through a
precise and uniform application. For this reason, the IMO has adopted its
"Guidance for the Uniform Application of Certain Rules" of the Collision
MANKABADY, IMO VOL. 1, supra note 85, at 1.
143. This Convention has seen many revisions: International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, London, June 17, 1960, entered into force, May 26, 1965, 536 U.N.T.S.
27; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, November 1, 1974, en-
tered into force, May 24, 1980, reprinted in 14 I.L.M 963; Protocol of 1978 Relating to the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, February 17, 1978, entered
into force May 1, 1981, reproduced from IMCO Document TSPP/CONF/10/Add.1, in
MOORE, supra note 118, at 324; 1981 Amendments to Protocol, London, November 1981,
entry into force September 1, 1984, reprinted in IMO STAT. OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS
29 (1984).
The 1960 SOLAS built upon the work of many previous safety of life at sea conven-
tions. As a result of The Titanic incident, the first convention was adopted in 1914.
MANKABADY, IMO VOL. 1, supra note 85, at 29.
144. ISF GUIDE, supra note 77; see also International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea in MooRE, supra note 118, at part B.
145. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
London, October 20, 1972, entered into force, July 15, 1977, U.N. Registration No. A-15824;
Cmnd. 6962; reprinted in SINGH, CONVENTIONS, supra note 121, at 3 (Vol. 1); QUENEUDEC,
CONVENTIONS MARITIMES INTERNATIONALES 287 (1979). See also 1981 Amendments to Con-
vention, London, November 19, 1981, entry into force, June 1, 1983, IMO Resolution A.464
(XII), in IMO STAT. OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS 31 (1984).
146. Countries which have adopted the rules include Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
France, German Democratic Republic, German Federal Republic, Greece, Honduras, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Liberia, Panama, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Saudis Arabia, USSR,
United Kingdom, and the United States. MANKABADY, THE LAW OF COLLISIONS AT SEA 557-
559 (1987)(hereinafter cited as MANKABADY, COLLISIONS).
147. Id. at 71.
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Regulations. " 8
Other widely-accepted regulations which indicate the international
community's concern with safety at sea include: The International Code
of Signals; 1 9 The International Convention on Load Lines; 50 The Ton-
nage Measurement of Ships Convention;15 The International Convention
for Safe Containers;152 The International Convention on Maritime Search
and Rescue;153 and The International Convention on Standards of Train-
ing, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers.5
The safety regulations detailed above may be enforced by port states.
Fourteen Western European states'5 5 have signed a "Memorandum on
Port Control" which attempts to prevent the operation of sub-standard
vessels. To this end, each state will require that foreign merchant ships
visiting their ports comply with the standards laid down in a number of
international instruments, including: The International Convention on
Load Lines, The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, The
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, and The Convention on The International
Regulation for Preventing Collisions at Sea.'
In addition to proposing general safety measures, international con-
ventions propose detailed measures to prevent, reduce and control pollu-
tion of the marine environment. Article 25 of the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas requires states to cooperate with competent international orga-
nizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas
148. MSC/Circ. 320, of April 5, 1982, cited in MANKABADY, COLLISIONS, supra note 146,
at 71, n.2.
149. MANKABADY, COLLISIONS, supra note 146, at 7. The first International Code of
Signals was drafted by the British Board of Trade in 1855. This code was revised several
times. A significantly different version was published by the International Radiotelegraph
Conference in 1930. After the establishment of the IMO, the Code was revised once more.
The IMO's Code, completed in 1964, embodied the principle that each signal had a com-
plete meaning and therefore it left out the vocabulary method used in the previous editions.
This Code was amended again in 1972, 1974, 1980, and 1984. Id.
150. London, April 5, 1966, 640 U.N.T.S 133; 18 U.S.T. 1857; T.I.A.S. 6331; SINGH,
CONVENTIONS, supra note 121, at 982 (Vol. 2) (1983); QUENEUDEC, supra note 146, at 381.
151. London, June 23, 1969, entered into force, July 18, 1982, U.N. Registration No.
A-21264; SINGH, CONVENTIONS, supra note 121, at 1848 (Vol. 2); QUENEUDEC, supra note 151,
at 433.
152. Geneva, December 2, 1972, entry into force, September 6, 1977, U.N. docs. E/
CONF.59/44 and E/CONF.59/46; 1064 U.N.T.S. 3; 29 U.S.T. 3709; T.I.A.S. 9037.
153. Hamburg, April 27, 1979, entered into force, June 22, 1985, reprinted in SINGH,
CONVENTIONS, supra note 121, at 1671 (Vol. 2).
154. London, July 7, 1978, entry into force, April 28, 1984, U.N. Regist. No. 20690,
IMO Publication Sales No. 78.15.E, at 5.
155. The fourteen states are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. The memorandum provides for wider participation
from non-EEC members with the consent of Party. States. MANKABADY, IMO VOL. 2, supra
note 67, at 38, n.3.
156. Id. at 39.
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resulting from any activities with "harmful agents.' 1 57 The main interna-
tional agreement of this type is the International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Pollution from Ships.15 1 Particular emphasis has been placed
on preventing oil pollution. 5 s Several widely-adopted international agree-
ments attempt to prevent this type of contamination of the seas.8 0 For
example, in 1975 the IMO adopted the "Code for the Construction and
Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquified Gas in Bulk" which provides
safety standards for the construction and operation of ships transporting
gas. 16
1
International agreements also attempt to compensate the victims of
oil pollution. Under the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damages,6 2 liability is placed on the owner of the ship
transporting oil. 163 The shipowner's liability is limited according to the
157. See art. 194 of the 1982 Convention, supra note 37.
158. London, November 2, 1973, entered into force, October 2, 1983, U.N. Doc. ST/
LEG/SER.B/18, at 457-517; 1973 U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 81 (1973). This is modified by the
Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, London, February 17, 1978, entered into force, October 2, 1983, U.N. Registra-
tion No. 22484; reprinted in IMO STAT. OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS 47 (1984).
159. A detailed discussion of these efforts are beyond the scope of this discussion. See
generally: KINDT, MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1986); GOLD, HANDBOOK ON
MARINE POLLUTION (1985); ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS, (2nd ed.
1985); HAKAPAA, MARINE POLLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: MATERIAL OBLIGATIONS AND JU-
RISDICTION (1981); Juda, IMCO and the Regulation of Oil Pollution from Ships," 26 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 558, 562-564 (1977); Anderson & Bissell, International Cooperation for the
Prevention of Marine Oil Pollution, SEA GRANT TECHNICAL BULLETIN No. 33 (1975); Men-
delson, Ocean Pollution and the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Environment, 3 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 385 (1971); Neuman, Oil on Troubled Waters: The International Control of Marine
Pollution, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 349 (1971).
160. See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
London, May 12, 1954, entered into force, July 26, 1958, U.N. document E/2609, ST/LEG/
SER.B/15, at 787-799, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, 12 U.S.T. 2989; T.I.A.S. 4900; International Conven-
tion relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Brussels,
November 19, 1969, entered into force May 6, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. 8068; Protocol
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances Other Than
Oil, London, November 2, 1973, entered into force, March 30, 1983, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/18, at 457-517.
161. Countries which have implemented the Gas Code in national regulations include:
the United States, Sweden, Japan, Norway, Netherlands, Mexico, Finland, and Belgium.
The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom apply the code on a voluntary basis.
MANKABADY, IMO VOL.1, supra note 85 at 78.
162. Brussels, November 29, 1969, entry into force, June 19, 1975, U.N. Regis. No. A-
14097; U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SERB/166, at 447-454; Protocol to the International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, London, November 19, 1976, entered into force,
April 8, 1981, U.N. Regis. No. A-14097, reprinted in SINGH, CONVENTIONS, supra note 121, at
2489 (Vol. 3).
163. Liability is placed upon the owner unless the damage (1) resulted from an act of
war or a natural phenomenon; (2) was wholly caused by an act or omission committed with
intent to cause damage to a third party; or (3) was wholly caused by the negligence or other
wrongful act of any government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights
or other navigational equipment. The text of the convention is reprinted in 64 A.J.I.L. 481
(1970). For an extensive discussion of the convention, see Healy, The International Conven-
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tonnage of the ship. Victims who are unable to obtain adequate compen-
sation under the Civil Liability Convention may receive relief under the
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Oil Pollution Damage.1 6 4
2. Domestic Standards
States must do more than follow internationally accepted safety and
anti-pollution standards to fulfill their obligation to neither impede nor
endanger other states' use of international waters. In addition, they must
attempt to abide by their own safety standards. Although domestic regu-
lations are not in themselves part of the corpus of international law, they
do have an important relationship to the international law of the sea. Do-
mestic standards exert a significant influence on the development of both
conventional and customary international law.16 5 Conversely, interna-
tional standards are reflected in domestic regulations because states fre-
quently incorporate all or part of international conventions into their own
legislation.
As noted above, Article 94 of the U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea requires that states take measures " 'as necessary' to ensure safety at
sea."16 In their own regulations, states define for themselves what they
believe is necessary to abide by this requirement. The state definition
may be more or less stringent than international regulations. In any
event, the regulations indicate the measures that a state believes are nec-
essary in order to sail a safe ship. 67 A state which does not even attempt
to comply with its own definition of safety, and acts in a manner which it
has defined as unsafe or environmentally unsound, cannot be said to be
fulfilling its obligation to sail safe ships.
Furthermore, domestic safety standards are important simply be-
cause international conventions do not cover every situation. When inter-
national conventions are not directly applicable, the only way to tell
whether a state is attempting to sail safe and nonpolluting ships is to
examine whether the state is in compliance with its own standards. Thus,
both international and domestic standards must be considered when de-
termining whether a flag state has fulfilled its safety obligations.
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1 J. MAR. L. & COM. 317 (1970).
164. Brussels, December 18, 1971, entered into force, October 16, 1978, U.N. Doc. ST/
LEG/SER.B/18, at 387. The Convention also provides some relief to shipowners who comply
with certain international safety and antipollution standards.
165. Francisco Orrego Vicuna, The Law of the Sea Experience and the Corpus of
International Law: Effects and Interrelation-ships, in THE DEVELOPING ORDER OF THE
OCEANS 11 (Krueger & Riesenfeld, eds. 1985)(stating that paramount example is that of the
exclusive economic zone).
166. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
167. See Transportation Institute Memorandum, The Safety of U.S.-Flag Ships Com-
pared to Flag of Convenience Ships, supra note 66, at 9.
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B. Whether the United States Met Its Obligations
The United States' actions in the reflagging of the Kuwaiti oil tank-
ers indicates that it was influenced in its decision by its international ob-
ligation to sail safe ships. If the United States had believed that it had no
obligations to the world community in the sailing of the Kuwaiti tankers,
it would have merely reflagged the vessels and declared them ready to sail
into the Persian Gulf. However, the United States did not stop with the
nearly-mechanical reflagging process. Rather, at great expense it followed
the mandate of Article 94 of the U.N. Conference of the Law of the Sea
and sent U.S. Coast Guard inspectors to inspect all ships on-site.16 8
Arguably, these actions were undertaken in order to ensure that the
ships complied with domestic regulations. However, as noted above, do-
mestic regulations reflect and incorporate international norms pertaining
to safety. In addition, a desire to comply with domestic regulations could
not have been the sole motivation for the costly inspections because
Coast Guard officials specifically were instructed to take steps to ensure
that international conventions were observed. Moreover, they were di-
rected to refuse to give waivers for violations of Safety of Life at Sea
Convention, or the International Load Line Convention.'6 9 Indeed, from
review of publicly released documents, it appears that all ships were
brought into compliance with international safety standards. 10
While the United States complied with international conventions, it
allowed the ships to sail in violation of several domestic safety and anti-
pollution regulations.' The extent to which these regulations were vio-
lated is not clear. It appears, however, that the ships fell below acceptable
standards in several important areas including: automation, steering gear
requirements, fire protection, navigation, and ventilation requirements. 7 '
Nevertheless, while national defense waivers were granted for some do-
mestic safety violations,' s the Coast Guard refused to grant waivers for
"manifestly unsafe conditions. ' ' 1 4
The only area in which the United States completely waived interna-
tional and domestic safety obligations is manning. By waiving its own
manning requirements, the United States failed to fulfill Article 94's re-
quirement that a flag state take measures to ensure safety at sea with
168. See supra note 21.
169. See Telex to Mr. Stafford, May 4, 1987, supra note 10; May 21 Coast Guard
Letter, supra note 20; House Memorandum, supra note 9, at 5.
170. House Memorandum, supra note 9.
171. The regulations for Coast Guard certification of foreign flag vessels brought under
the U.S. flag are set forth in U.S. Coast Guard Navigation and Inspection Circular 10-81
(October 5, 1981). Additional requirements apply to oil tankers traveling in U.S. waters. See
Davis, Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972: An expansion of the Federal Approach to
Oil Pollution, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249 (1975).
172. House Memorandum, supra note 9.
173. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 10.
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respect to manning ships and training seamen. 175 It allowed the ships to
sail without meeting the U.S. manning requirements which provide that
on U.S.-flag vessels, upon leaving a U.S. port, at least 75 percent of the
unlicensed crew and all of the officers must be American citizens.1 7 6 Since
the tankers were not departing from a U.S. port, the Coast Guard rea-
soned, they were not required to use an American crew other than a
master.
1 7
The loophole in the manning requirements has been closed by the
passage of a law which requires that the manning requirements apply re-
gardless of whether the ship calls upon domestic ports.1 7 8 This means that
the if U.S. citizens are available for employment, they may be placed on
the Kuwaiti tankers. Still, language in the existing law 7 9 and contained
within the new provisions permits the President to waive the citizenship
requirements for either a national emergency or because of lack of quali-
fied seamen. 80
While the manning policy stems in part from economic and military
concerns, it also addresses safety concerns. By monitoring the qualifica-
tions and training requirements of U.S. seamen, the Coast Guard ensures
that crews comprised of U.S. citizens are capable of sailing ships safely
and of managing emergency situations. For example, licensed masters,
mates, engineers, pilots, operators and radio officers must satisfy specific
statutory requirements.181 These and other manning requirements en-
hance the safety of U.S.-flagged vessels and, in ordinary situations, should
be followed.
However, the situation in the Persian Gulf is not ordinary; oil tank-
ers are not usually accompanied by a military escort. Under the ex-
traordinary circumstances presented in the Gulf, military concerns dic-
tate manning policies, rather than safety concerns. Therefore, under the
extraordinary circumstances, the United States' decision to waive its own
manning requirements was within its discretion. 2
175. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
176. 46 U.S.C. § 8103(b) (1987).
177. Supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
178. H.R. 2598 was adopted into law on January 11, 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-239.
179. 46 U.S.C. § 8103(h) (1987).
180. As of this writing, a waiver has not yet been requested but it is likely that it will
be requested in the near future. U.S. maritime unions are attempting to~counter this antici-
pated request by underscoring the availability of American seamen. The Seafarers Union,
for example, has initiated a membership letterwriting campaign requesting employment
aboard the U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tankers. Memorandum to all area vice-presidents, port
agents and filed representatives, from Frank Drozak, President, Seafarers International
Union (January 20, 1988).
181. 46 U.S.C. § 7101 (1987); 46 C.F.R. §§ 5.01-1 et seq. (1987).
182. This does not mean that other countries should have he unrestricted ability to
waive manning requirements. Under more stable conditions, when a ship is reflagged for
economic reasons, a state still is obligated to take measures to ensure safety at sea with
respect to manning ships and training seamen.
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V. CONCLUSION
This discussion has attempted to emphasize the importance under
international law of the decision to flag and sail a ship. The flag which a
ship bears is not only a symbol of a link between a ship and a state, but
also a symbol of a link between a state and the international community.
The United States' decision to reflag eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers may be
characterized simply as a political decision. This does not mean, however,
that this action could have been properly undertaken without considera-
tion for the world community. All flag states, including those whose fleets
might be considered to be sailing under flags of convenience, must fulfill
two categories of responsibilities to the world community.
First, states must grant nationality to ships according to internation-
ally accepted criteria. Currently, registration is both necessary and suffi-
cient in order to establish nationality under international law. The
United States met this criterion by properly registering and documenting
the Kuwaiti tankers. But responsibilities to the world community do not
stop with the granting of nationality. States also have an affirmative obli-
gation to attempt to sail ships. In consideration for the right of all states
to sail on the high seas, states must sail only those ships which are be-
lieved safe. In sailing the Kuwaiti tankers, the United States was cogni-
zant of this general obligation. At great expense, the United States en-
sured that the tankers met international safety standards and most
domestic standards.
It is likely that maritime flags will continue to be used for both polit-
ical and economic reasons. In the future, states should continue to be
aware of the implications of their decisions to grant nationality to a ship
and their general obligation to sail safe ships. Only if states attempt to
fulfill their responsibilities to the world community can freedom of the
high seas continue to exist.
Julie Mertus
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